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Abstract 
 
Beings, animate or inanimate, are dynamical systems that continuously interact with the 
(external and /or internal) environment through the physical or physiologic interfaces of 
their Kantian (representational) realities. And the nature of their reactions is determined 
by their systems’ inner workings. It is from this perspective that this work attempts to 
address some of the long held philosophical questions; major one among them 
consciousness, in the context of the physicality of such systems. And to this end, the 
approach relies upon the appropriate governing mathematical formalisms of system’s 
operations (behavior): For higher beings, the computational theory of the brain (Edelman 
1987; Kandel 2013), despite lack of details, provides the necessary insights into the likely 
mathematical processes which must be behind the operations of the system. For 
inanimate matter, the process is gravely simpler: the responses to environmental (initial 
and boundary) conditions   (inputs) are governed by its field equation (constitutive 
properties, and constitutive and conservation laws), which render physical changes, 
which are the expressions (outputs) some of which may appear on their interfaces with 
their external environment. In the former, that is the case of the higher beings, their 
systems’ operations are generally very complex and inevitably would involve brain 
(computed) solutions of discerned complexities (from sense organ inputs) and streaming 
downloads of the results (perceptions/conceptions outputs), through the nervous system, 
to the body physiologic interfaces, for their expressions. The latter expressions are 
animate functions and characteristics such as biological sustenance; maintenance, 
behavior, thoughts and vocalizations; and the seemingly awareness of sentience, and 
other associated phenomena, which together define the consciousness, albeit with some 
reporting shortcoming due to interface display limitations.  
  
Prima facie, the genesis of the consciousness, from the view point of dynamic system 
theory, -- being simply expressions of some of the results of their interaction  with the 
environment -- allows for the generalization of this phenomenon, which is considered 
only a higher animate peculiarity, to all matter with spatial representation, --animate or 
otherwise -- granted with vast differences of the nature, and complexities of the related 
expressions, some of which in humans are referred to as the “experiences of 
consciousness.” In such realm, consciousness is fundamental to all matter with objective 
and subjective aspects to it: the potential to react signifies the “objective consciousness;” 
and the nature of the reaction defines the “subjective consciousness.” And it is the 
specificity of the latter, of whatever nature, which separates the animate from the 
inanimate existence.  
Within the laid out framework of the present theory, the big baffling question of 
philosophy, as well as how and where the human subjective experiences of consciousness 
happen, the hard problem (Chalmers, 1995), find plausible answers: All aspects of 
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human consciousness, are renditions of the results of some of the brain computed events 
(perceptions/conceptions), -- in response to external and internal stimuli –-  by neural 
mechanisms (Schad, 2016), as functions and expressions, in different modes, through  
various physiological body interfaces. In humans, the utterance interface displays two of 
the major components of consciousness of special interest to this work; the thought and 
the vision: they are certain streamed downloads of perceptions, which are expressed by 
this interface (Schad, 2016), mostly inaudibly; though occasionally sounded off, as loud 
thinking. However, at times, the complexities of the thought and vision (download) 
contents, – likely involving an extensive Lexicon – render their occurring audible 
reporting deficient due to vocal instrument filtering. And this inevitable physiologic 
shortfall (caused by vocal frequency bandwidth limitation),-- the incompleteness of the 
audible expressions of subjective consciousness-- recognized as the hard problem, is very 
likely sanctioned by the evolutionary processes due to the absence of any survival value.  
This proposed system theory approach to the understanding of the human sentience and 
other facets of the brain (mind), follows and  complements the (generally accepted) 
cognitive sciences reductionist (experimentally based) consensus of absence of free will. 
 
Key Words:  Computational Brain; Cognition; Consciousness; Unconscious; 
Panpsychism  
 
Introduction 
 
“….Perhaps it will take the thinking in a science such as biology, which is of a more 
general order than the three with which we have been concerned, psychology, medicine, 
and sociology, to provide the answer all three are seeking” 
Samuel J. Beck and Herman B, Molish (1959) 
 
Today’s much advanced state of knowledge owes much to the symbiotic efforts of the 
fields of philosophy and sciences, which have continued throughout all ages. However 
the rapid development of natural sciences, which had started since ninetieth century, and  
that of the advances of the sciences of the brain that had taken roots early in the twentieth 
century, have been increasingly influencing philosophy; and been of prodigies help in 
search for answers to its long held big questions. Nonetheless, as it has always been the 
case with all the frontiers of knowledge, philosophy remains to continue its synthesis of 
the facts of the mind phenomena to finally trigger the development of relevant scientific 
theories. As it stands, the philosophical world still remains with all of its big question 
such as the nature of reality; mind-body problem; free will, etc.; and then the most 
important one, the beholder of them all; the main characteristic of sentience, the 
consciousness. The very phenomenon of consciousness, at least in case of human beings, 
has been behind whatever sense of life they have, in general, and, in particular, driving 
the efforts to divulge its very own rendering. And despite the knowledge of sciences and 
humanities embedded in it collectively, the puzzle of the promoter itself (the 
consciousness) remains the major challenge that philosophy, and some of its recent 
daughter sciences, are facing. The perplexed state of the knowledge, in regards to the 
questions of the mind, is evinced in the opinion polls taken from philosophers across 
many world institutions, over past few years (Bourget, and Chalmers 2013): the apparent 
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stagnation, has led to examination of philosophy’s reasoning structure; by some of its 
(today’s) brilliant and ardent torch bearers (e.g., Chalmers talk 2014). In such 
evaluations, the lack of progress is being attributed to the weaknesses in the philosophy’s 
arguable premises for the mind; and for how sentience is to be unraveled. Recent Phil 
paper surveys results are reflected in David Chalmers (2014) statement:”  
There is no collective convergence about truth of the big questions of philosophy such as 
mind body, Free will, etc., because there are no indisputable premises (axioms, or a more 
fitting term ”postulate”) to base the argumentative approach of philosophy on them, in 
order to come up with their compelling proof.” 
However, there is an exception in this finding and that is the fact that opinions on 
consciousness are seemingly converging: there is consensus  in parsing the difficulties of 
understanding consciousness into hard and easy problems, -- from the view point of the 
involved complexities – which could render them more tractable: The first category is 
ascribed to the subjective phenomena, “which result from physical processes and yet not 
explainable by them (Chalmers, 1995);” and therefore, the experiences of consciousness 
(the hard part), such as feelings, emotions, thought, etc., not explainable because of the 
absence of any functional attributes, have remained an enigma so far. But the functional 
events of consciousness (the easy problems), are thought to be possibly explainable by 
cognitive process of the brain (Chalmers, 1995). The latter designation does not by no 
means imply that the detail of the related mental operation are known, but the prospects 
are thought to be favorable, and much better understanding of them is likely to happen 
within this century (Chalmers 2013). The optimism is based on recent progress in 
sciences that has opened up the possibilities of achieving some insight into the mysteries 
of the brain operations in general, and of consciousness phenomena in particular. This 
opportunity is specifically owed to new understandings of brain functions due to the 
extensive neurosciences research   (Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell 2000), on the one hand, 
and artificial intelligence successes through deployments of the traditional and the 
neural/neuronal network computers (Turing 1948, McCulloch 1993; Von Neumann 1958; 
Churchland 1992; Edelman 1987; Arbib 1989), on the other, which together have led to 
the formulation of the concept of the computational brain theory. This brain theory is 
presently widely accepted (Kandel 2013; Churchland 1992; Wilczek, 2008), and it’s 
standing according to cognitive neuroscientist Jack Gallant (2016) is the following: 
“Brain is a hierarchically parallel distributed network of tightly interconnected areas 
feeding forward and feeding backward  information all over the place and we really have 
no concept how such a network should compute information.”  
The experimentally established computational brain theory has helped to consolidate 
some of the divided philosophical schools on the side of determinism (works such as  
Soon et al, 2008 and Fried et al., 2011), though still falling short of explicating how and 
where the experiences of consciousness, such as  vision and thought, occur. The laborious 
work of Eric B, Baum entitled in” what is thought,” published in 2004, exploits the 
computational brain theory to address the big questions of the mind, with consciousness 
among them: The following quotes: “…computer scientists are confident that thought, 
and for that matter life, arises from execution of a computer program;” and “Mind is 
flow of information, and consciousness is the experience of the information” capture 
some of his very valuable insights, expressed in the work. However, this substantial 
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work, relying on speculative evolutionary biologic claims, and computational principles, 
falls short of providing indisputable arguments towards achieving its very goal: 
Compatibilism shortcomings and La Mettrie type confusion persists; and “Cogito Ergo 
Sum”, remains even more vague despite the heroic effort!   
 
Different schools of philosophy such as Materialism, Idealism, Dualism, and 
Panpsychism, have various palatable takes of the consciousness dilemma; and 
panpsychism (the belief that everything has a mind), holds that consciousness is an 
intrinsic property of matter.  According to Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia “the 
underlying premise in panpsychism, at its very microphysical levels, somehow, builds into 
animate beings’ subjective consciousness experiences.”   However, all the ideas still 
remain speculative at their core! As a way out of the conundrum, Chalmers (1995) 
suggests a theory of consciousness that takes conscious experience as a fundamental 
property of the brain; and further claims that “we might explain familiar consciousness 
phenomena involving experience in terms of more basic principals involving experience 
and other entities.” He asserts that taking experience, the inseparable feature of life, as an 
axiom, may provide the basis for a general theory of consciousness. To this end, 
Chalmers’ speculative theory relies on (personal) subjective experience data and on the 
subjects’ verbal reports relating to their experience (Chalmers, 1996). However, the thesis 
as skillfully as it is put forward, aligned partly with panpsychism philosophy, -- the latter 
unlike its past is being taken more seriously by other schools of philosophy -- similarly 
suffers from the arguable premises syndrome. 
  
As such, need for a robust theory that can address the mind and all its attributes, still 
persists -- a philosopher’s stone to be found! Present work is an attempt in meeting the 
challenge by deploying the functional knowledge of the brain -- what facts   the cognitive 
sciences have established so far -- in a radically different context: that of the all inclusive 
computational nervous (central and peripheral) system machinery, in the context of 
dynamic system theory; it is in such context that the development of a general inferential 
theory of the mind, with emphasis on consciousness, is aimed at: To this end two 
available works will be heavily drawn upon, namely, Schad (2016) and Schad (2016), 
where the natures of the brain computer and its dynamics; and how and where 
perceptions of thought, vision and other facets of mind occur, are theorized. The general 
framework of the approach has precedence in the field of cognitive psychology, in what 
is called the “Embodied brain” approach (see Kiverstein and Miller, 2015), which only 
serves to indicate the coming to terms of the “Field” with the role of the initial and 
boundary conditions; (“the skilled organism environment interactions”), – familiar to 
applied physic and engineering community -- on the cognition (computational) processes 
of the brain, implications of which is of importance to various aspects of human 
psychological mental states.  
 
In summary, the present work which is based on the scientific inferences drawn from the 
computational functioning of the central nervous system with brain at the helm,  explores 
brain  perception processes, on the basis  of the nature of the brain computer and its 
mathematical computations formalism; and  how they give rise  to the  consciousness; 
and other philosophically contentious sentience related phenomena --  such as free will, 
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nature of reality, and etc., in the context of a new understanding of the brain operations. 
Specifically, consciousness is reasoned to be the innate characteristic of all systems, 
animate or otherwise, which in case of higher beings, humans in particular, draw its 
essence autonomously from their brains. And the work well accords -- contrary to what 
philosopher D.C. Dennett (1996) suggests– with the take of Charles Darwin (1859), 
reflected in the following statement:  
 
“Nevertheless, the differences in mind between man and higher animals, as great as it is, 
certainly is one of degree and not kind.” 
 
The Theory   
 
…” I will write about human beings as though I were concerned with lines and plains 
and solids” 
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677 A.D.) 
 
“Life and soul are one, an animating and expansive force present in everything 
everywhere” 
Anaximenes (585-528 B.C.) 
  
All Beings animate or inanimate are dynamical systems that continuously interact with 
their (external/internal) environments through physiological or physical interfaces of their 
systems’ (Kantian) realities. And the nature of their reactions (functions and interface 
expressions, which evolution deemed necessary), are determined by their systems’ inner 
workings. Given the complexities of most systems, clear understanding of most systems’ 
inner working details, is not generally possible. However, the system functional 
generalities which have already been established can provide the basis for the 
development of concepts from the perspective of the dynamical system theory; and such 
is the basis of the work presented here: In case of inanimate matter, the field equations 
(constitutive properties, and constitutive and conservation laws) generally allow 
(analytic/numerical) determination of their systems’ reactions to the variations of the 
environmental conditions, and hence the resulting expressions (behavior). Their systems’ 
physical changes (interface displays), that is, the expressions of their varying reactions, 
indicate the dynamics of their existence. For higher animate beings, emphatically 
humans, the systems’ behaviors (functional operations) are governed by the mathematical 
formalisms, which must be (inherently) geared in their computational brains (Kandel, 
Schwartz and Jessell 2000), -- based on cognitive neurosciences understanding – though, 
the details, which would be the key to the development of a fundamental theory of the 
mind in general, and consciousness in particular, is not still known. And such details, if 
known, would encompass knowledge of the nature of the brain computer, i.e., what kind 
of computer it is; and what mathematical formalism underlies its operations -- 
considering the obvious complexities involved in reaching this end, it is not likely that 
any solid understanding of the dynamics of the brain computational operations will be 
established in the foreseeable future.  However, as in all challenges sciences face, the 
immensity of the task, same also in this case, is not a barrier to a first order attempt of 
conceiving a plausible theory for the brain functional (computational) operations. The 
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present work embarks toward this goal by the presumption of likely semblance of the 
brain computer – from ground level operational perspective -- to those of the (brain 
inspired) scientific neural and neuronal networks (Edelman, 1987; Arbib 1989) – the 
similitude principal (Rayleigh, 1915) adds further credence to this extrapolation. The 
scientific neural and neuronal networks are well known statistical computational methods 
-- presently augmented by deep learning (supervised or reinforced) processes -- for the 
development of the advanced levels of artificial intelligence (AI). Grand 
multidisciplinary projects, such as Machine Intelligence from Cortical Networks 
(MCrONS), project (David Cox, Harvard University), are efforts to approach creation of 
human like intelligence. From the underlying presumptions in such endeavors, it further 
follows that the essence of the brain neuronal computation (solution) scheme, at its very 
fundamental levels, could be likened to that of the most basic scheme (implicitly) involved 
in the computational operations of the scientific neural networks.  In such layout the 
brain and the rest of the nervous system, are posited to discern (resolve) any sense 
stimulating natural phenomena, -- that it to (implicitly) algorithmize them in the 
infinitude of the discrete synaptic nodal domain of the brain -- and to solve (mostly by 
trial-and error) the resulting equations (Shad, 2016), to render perceptions, which define 
some aspects of the mind and the consciousness: This presumed dynamics behind the 
operations of the central nervous system, would expectedly accord with  the following 
premises:1) the autonomous data processing and computations in the brain, would 
provide possible solutions for various  complexities, discerned in various states of their 
manifestations; 2), streaming downloads of the results via the nervous circuitry, would 
render expressions -- at the human interfaces-- of animation; functions such as  biological 
sustenance, maintenance and  behavior; and the awareness of sentience, and its associated 
phenomena, which define the consciousness phenomenon; and 3), expressions of 
consciousness would be limited due to the inevitable interface (frequency bandpass) 
filtering of the massive volume of streamed downloads of the results of the brain 
computations – such drawbacks are normally expected in any input/output system. 
  
Consciousness development relies on the simulations (computations) in the brain, which 
renders recreations of events, phenomena and the world, which all together make up the 
experiences of being.  The simulations, of whatever nature, are most likely the processing 
and executions of the  life span learned, and evolution hacked, neuronal ciphers (patterns, 
i.e., software and firmware), prompting potentiation, induced in turn by  proper 
expression of genes, at synapses,  -- beholden by some of the known and perhaps (98%) 
unknown (if they  are not rubbish junk according to Brenner, 2013)  segments of neural 
DNA -- rendering the excitatory and inhibitory tasks that produces what “is not  a cause, 
it is an effect,” as Dennett (20016) puts it. Some of results (outputs), which find 
syntactical expressions in thought, -- in the (possibly vast) lexicon of its language -- are 
not necessarily fully available for the efflorescence of talk -- as known; some  are 
reportable in speech and loud thinking, and some as in feelings, emotions and other 
experiences, which are not satisfactorily reportable. Within the context of the system 
approach, it is mostly in thought and talks that consciousness debuts itself. Since thought 
is a tangible event on which humans have seemingly some controls over, the questions of 
where it occurs, perhaps is one that hits closer to home! Given that thought is the result 
(output) of the brain computations, there must be an interface where its expression 
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happen: only movable body parts (including facial muscles)  and vocal cords are the  
apparent candidate interfaces to which  somatic and visceral output (efferent) signals 
from the brain, reaches  -- by means of motor sensory neurons -- displaying the features 
of consciousness.  Such, has long been recognized as explicitly indicated in Confessions 
(St. Augustine, 397 AD): 
“And that they meant this thing and no other was plain from the motion of their body, the 
natural language, as it were, of all nations, expressed by the countenance, glances of the 
eye, gestures of the limbs, and tone of voice, indicating the affections of the mind, as it 
pursues, possesses, rejects, or shuns.” 
The fact that thoughts are not always vocalized (reported), makes it possible to suggest – 
drawing upon Ockham’s razor principal -- a silent muffled mode for the vocal system -- 
where the computed thought and thinking appear mainly inaudibly (other physiological 
displays aside), thus introducing a bi-modal utterance system (activated in either mode by 
a preamble signal), which act as the display medium; vocal mode for language 
(Chomsky, 2013) and subvocal mode for thought. Putting it succinctly: Utterance (vocal) 
Interface is the main venue for outputting brain’s results of simulations of the real world 
and some aspects of interactions with it; in audible (referential or verbal) and mostly 
inaudible (thought) displays.  And the fact that thoughts can always be verbalized amid 
thinking adds enough confidence to the above claim –- the latter can simply be tested.  
Another, and further, indication of it is the presence of subvocal activity during thinking 
that apparently behaviorist took note of long ago, and even went as far as to claim the 
possibility of decoding it:  it is anecdotally reported by Will Durant (1991) in a quote 
from Spinoza: 
“Have not the behaviorist proposed to detect a man’s thought by recording those 
involuntary vibrations in his vocal cord that seem to accompany all thinking.” 
Subvocal Laryngeal (electromyography) recording has been deployed in psychiatric 
patients for clues for behavioral treatments of Hallucination (Green and Kinsbourne, 
1998). Of course detecting (decoding) thoughts from subvocal activities is an enormous 
task involving stochastic/Neuronal, and more, along the line of the recent work by 
Nishimoto et al., (2011), which is aimed at “Reconstructing visual experiences from 
brain activity evoked by natural movies.”  Quoting Gallant (2016):“ 
If there is something in emergent working cognitive memory space, potentially it is 
decodable information.”  
Perhaps supplementing anatomic MRI (diffusion and functional) efforts, along with the 
very non-smoothed signals (as opposed to those of voxels) from the subvocal activity, 
should be a boon to semantic extraction that is pursued in decoding research. 
Besides thought, vision is the other very important phenomenon of consciousness: Other 
than attracting questions about its experience, the complexity of its unconscious 
development, has led to the general collective assumption of it being a fundamental 
property of Beings who have eyes; also seemingly, the  knowledge of the anatomy and 
physics of vision’s physiologic embodiment (Schwarz S.H. 1999), has served as the 
convincing rational for the assumption. However, vision, as in thought, begets the 
questions of how does one see what is seen and where it happens? Addressing the Tactile 
Vision (Bach-y-Rita 2006), and the Mirror Neuron (Keysers, et. al. 2004) phenomena,  
Schad (2016) theorizes that brain processes for vision sensation, are basically similar 
those of tactile sensations, except for involvements of more of the brain’s neuronal 
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network and constructs (patterns), in the former. And seeing is but an autonomous 
recitation (reporting) of the sensation, at the utterance interface -- in the absence of such 
facility other bodily interfaces, as in case of other beings that lacks it, would perform the 
task. Also additional evidence pointing at the tactile nature of vision is the fMRI activity 
of parts of visual cortex during Brail reading by blind subjects (Lipman, 2014). Schad 
(2016) putts it summarily in the following::  
The experience of vision is in reality just inaudible, and occasionally audible, recital (of 
its semantics) of the likes of reporting in case of massive cutaneous sensing, and 
apperception of the environment; and, it is the same, in essence, for all, blind and 
otherwise, which in the former is understandably drastically limited. 
Therefore, Vision thought, speech and what defines consciousness with all its bells and 
whistles, and everything that relates to the activities of the mind, are brain perceptions, -- 
being results of execution of brain programs --  which are broadcasted as expression on 
physiologic interfaces.  
The reasoning so far, having laid out a possible rational for how computational brain and 
the rest of the nervous system-- in the context of dynamic system theory – can account 
for many aspects of the mind in general, and processes of consciousness, in particular, -- 
of how and where they materialize, and also provides a plausible logic for resolving the 
hard problem of consciousness; its subjective aspect, as put by Chalmers (1995): 
“A phenomena which is physically based and yet not explainable by it.”  
In the context of the present work, the hard problem finds the following simple 
explanation: 
Subjective consciousness is the thought expressions of the streaming downloads of the 
constructed brain perceptions (concomitant with memory registrations), which may only 
be partially reportable (i.e., some not utterable); due to the complexity of the contents, -- 
perhaps because of the richness of its lexicon -- and the bandpass limitation of the vocal 
cords, which could filter them. At much simpler levels, the inability of verbalization in 
reproducing of some natural sounds one hears is well known in all languages. This  vocal 
reporting shortcoming could have very likely been sanctioned by the evolutionary 
processes -- perhaps because reporting to other fellow humans of ”what is it to be me,” or 
of  “the color perceptions,” has had no survival value,  at least in the eye blink of time 
since our appearance  on this planet. 
Despite the complexity of the environmental interactions of animate matter, and the 
innate simplicity of the in animate matter, the concept of consciousness can be 
generalized, to both, from the perspective of dynamic system theory in that they all react 
(respond) to the environmental inputs. This common characteristic, this intrinsic property 
of all objects with spatial representation, may be referred to as the objective 
consciousness; and the nature of the reaction which separates animate from inanimate, 
designates their subjective consciousness < Fig 1>. 
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Figure 1- Matter consciousness depiction 
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This generalized concept of consciousness, accords partly with panpsychism claim; an 
idea that perhaps has roots in very early thinking: the following quote from Aristotle 
(Durant, 1991), well speaks to the concept of universality of consciousness, 
notwithstanding the obvious error: 
“Nature makes so gradual a transition from the inanimate to animate kingdom that the 
boundary lines which separates them are indistinct and doubtful.” 
The generalized consciousness theory is anecdotally evinced in the claims of the 
experiences of unison with nature by subjects in (authority sanctioned) hallucinogenic 
drug experiments; and by practitioners of intense meditation. In both cases, subjects’ 
brain circuitry gets extensively engaged (chemically affected or overwhelmed), –- 
evinced by multichannel EEG data (Nader, 2014), and fMRI (NPR’s Radiolab report on 
LSD experiments (2016), and Marina, 1999).  And during this process a “hang” situation 
is very likely occurring in the brain operations: most perception computation come to a 
halt -- at least in case of meditation with a nonsensical mantra (irresolvable problem), it is 
likely that the futile brain attempt for solution heavily taxes most of the brain circuitry. 
Therefore, in such state, output streaming become very limited to a great extent. And of 
course a time-lapse memory track of the period is registered: perhaps a record of what the 
universal objective consciousness engenders; the effects of the matter world interaction 
and perhaps even microphysical entanglement with the environment, when normal sense 
interactions in the context of physiologic animation are gravely suppressed, or altogether 
are absent. Obviously, the (ever present unconscious computation operations) circuitry 
for biological sustenance is not affected during such experiences.  Finally, this 
perspective of consciousness adds much credibility to panpsychism philosophy; perhaps 
their philosopher’s stone is found! 
Also this work   provides the proper ground for establishing the idea of Man Machine. 
The concept has its roots in Descartes (1960), and later taken up by La Mettrie, in his 
“L’Homme Machine (1747)”, -- understandably facing insurmountable difficulties -- and 
shared vigorously by Schopenhauer (1855), and by many (to some degree) in recent years 
(e.g. Baum (2004); Mlodinow 2011). However, in the context of the present work, the 
idea proves seemingly very plausible, since it considers higher beings as biological 
dynamic systems -- with brains (the puppeteer, according to Chomsky, 2016) and the rest 
of the nervous system, as the control system-- with physiologic mouthpieces, which 
simply broadcasts their presence. Following quote from the Nobel Laureate Sydney 
Brenner (Woodham 2014), who in a recorded gathering of scientist, puts the overall 
claim in the proper context: 
“1) How do the genes specify and build a machine that performs the behavior, and 2) 
how does the machine perform the behavior? The answer to the first one is we do not 
know, but the answer to the second one is that it would depend on the queued memory 
and boundary condition, like any readymade machine.” 
 The following statement by Philosopher David Hume (1739) sums up the sense of being 
in the followings: 
“We are nothing but a bundle or collection of perceptions which succeed each other with 
inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement” 
 
Experimental Support of the Theory 
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This proposed approach to the understanding of the human sentience and other facts of 
life in the context of the dynamic system theory, is partially, though not conclusively, 
supported by 1), the experimental works of  Soon et al, 2008 and Fried et al., 2011, in 
addressing the experience of will:  the latter research summarize its findings,  as “… that 
the experience of will emerges as the culmination of premotor activity (probably in 
combination with networks in parietal cortex) starting several hundreds of ms before 
awareness,” which purports to the underlying essence of the theory; and 2), the result of 
the analysis of multichannel EEG recordings of subjects during transcendental meditation 
experiments (Stanford Higher State Lectures), which verifies the reported claims of 
absence of space and time and body sense, by the coherent Alpha waves; seemingly a  no 
download episode in wakeful healthy subjects, while the brain is at full computation 
capacity, -- resulting from  irresolvability of the submitted problem (a nonsensical 
Mantra) -- causes a “hang” state, when   much of the characteristics of sentience 
disappears.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The computational theory of the brain has been deployed to find  answers to some of the 
long held major questions of philosophy: To this end, three propositions were put 
forward: 1) that Given the theory, it is the computational outputs of the brain which are 
relayed through motorsensory neurons to the body’s physiological interfaces, which 
render animation and, in case of many beings, vocalizations, thought, vision, and  other 
effects, together defining the phenomenon of consciousness; and, 2), that, in the case of 
higher beings, it is the vocal interface, referred to here as utterance interface, which is the 
main medium of expressions of perceptions that  broadcasts the conscious mental states in 
bi-modal, audible and inaudible, modes of the vocal box.; and 3), that brain is in essence 
an equation solver, which discerns being’s dynamic environment (as sets of parametric 
linear equations), through stimulation of body’s senses,  and solves them (by trial-and-
error); and outputs the results as  expressions at  body’s extremities. And that through 
heredity and learning brain engenders many such equations as readymade patterns 
(neuronal constructs), available for immediate or fast solutions of discerned problems -- 
in the likeness of today’s deep learning (supervised or reinforced) in Artificial 
Intelligence developments. 
The computational  brain theory is further engaged to infer that, 1) despite the complex 
functional operations of the central nervous system, which render  (animate) 
consciousness (other physiologic activities aside), all matters, animate or inanimate, in 
the paradigm of the input output systems, have consciousness; and 2), that the mere fact 
of interaction with the environment, defines its objective aspect; and what make 
appearance at the interfaces (the expression), determines its subjective aspects, which is a 
function of the matter’s inner workings (physical, or biophysical governing rules); while 
limited by the medium of its broadcast. In this light, the question of consciousness of all 
higher beings is also settled. 
The imbedded consistency of the approach in the analysis of the nature of consciousness 
of higher animate matter (much explored by Baum 2004),  ), also allows for all aspects of 
Qualia (regardless of different philosophical takes), as well as providing inroads for all 
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big questions of philosophy. Finally, the reasoning for the concept of universality of 
consciousness, which also accords with Yogi’s claims (based on their repeatable 
experiences during intensive TM meditation), supports, as well, the main axiom of the 
Panpsychism theory, and provides philosophy with grounds for unarguable premises. 
 
References 
 
Arbib A. M.  (1989) The metaphorical brain 2, Neural network and beyond. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons 
 
Beck J. S. and Molish B. H. (1959) Reflexes To Intelligence, A reader in clinical 
psychology; Free Press: Glencoe Illinois  
 
Bach-y-Rita (2006) Tactile substitution studies. Annals of New York Academy of Sciences 
1013, pp. 83-91 
 
Baum B. E. (2004) What is thought?.  Cambridge: A Bradford Book, MIT Press 
 
Bourget D. and Chalmers J. D. (2013) What Do Philosophers Believe?  Philpapers 
Survey 
 
Broad, C. D. (1978) Kant: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Chalmers D. J. (1995) Facing Up to the Problems of Consciousness, Journal of 
Consciousness studies, 2(3), pp. 200-219 
 
Chalmers D. J. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental theory, Oxford 
University Press 
 
Chalmers D. J. (1997) Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness, Journal of 
consciousness Studies, 4(1), pp. 3-46 
 
Chalmers D. J. (2014) The Hard Problem of Consciousness, 342 yeas on; 20th 
Anniversary Conference, Towards a Science of Consciousness. Tucson Arizona  
 
Chomsky N. (2007) On language. New York: New York Press 
 
Chomsky N. (2012) Language and Other Cognitive Processes, Recorded talk, WGBH 
Forum (online)  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6i_W6Afed2k [Nov. 2014] 
 
Chomsky & Krauss (2015) An Origin Projects Dialogue.  
[Online] ,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBVb6wRdwV4[Jan 2016]  
 
Chun Siong Soon; Marcel Brass; Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes (2008) 
Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, Nature Neuroscience, 
11, pp. 543 - 545 
 14 
 
 
Church A.  (1936) An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory, Journal of 
Symbolic Logic, 4. pp. 53–60  
 
Churchland P. S. and T. J. Seinowski (1992) The computational brain. Computational 
Neuroscience, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press 
 
Darwin, C. (1859) The origin of species, New York: P. F. Collier & Sons Company 
 
Descartes, Rene (1960) Discourse on Method (1637), trans. Laurence J. LaFleur, 3d ed. 
New York: Bobs Merrill 
 
Durant, W. (1991) The Story of Philosophy. Simon and Schuster: New York 
 
Edelman, G.  (1987)  Neural Darwinism: the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, New 
York: Basic book 
 
Fried, Itzhak; Mukamel, Roy; Kreiman, Gabriel (2011) Internally Generated 
Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition," 
Neuron. 69 (3), pp. 548–62 
 
Gallant J. (2016) Mapping, modeling and decoding the human brain,  
[Online],https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzxQbdUryHU[Dec. 2016] 
 
Green M.F. and M Kinsbourne (1990) subvocal activity and auditory 
hallucinations: Clues for behavioral treatments? Schizophrenia 
Bulletin,16 (4), pp. 617-625 
 
Haldane B. R. and Kemp J. (1908) Schopenhauer A. (trans.). The World As Will And 
Idea; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &Co 
 
Hoffman D. (2014) Consciousness Agents: A Formal Theory of Consciousness; 20th 
Anniversary Conference, Towards a Science of Consciousness; Tucson Arizona, April 
21-26 
 
Hume David (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature. John Noon: London 
 
Kandel R. C. Schwartz H. J. Jessell T. M. (2000) Principles of. Neurosciences. New 
York: McGraw-Hill 
 
Kandel R. E.  (2013). The New Science of the Mind, Grey Matter, The New York Times, 
Sunday Review, Opinion Page Dec. 1st 
 
Kant I.. (1902). Critique of Pure Reason, New York:  Macmillan 
 
 15 
Keysers C., Wicker B., Gazzola V., Anton J-L., Fogassi, L. Gallese V. (2004) A touching 
sight SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touch. Neuron. 42 (2), 
pp.  335-346 
 
Kiverstein J. and Miller M. (2015).. The embodied brain: toward a radical embodied 
cognitive neuroscience. Front Hum. Neurosci.. 9, pp. 237-247 
 
Lipman J. (2014) Stanford Lectures: Higher States, [Online], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FysEMS1rgrw 
 
Mariña J. (1999) LSD Experiments, 
The Journal of Religion 79 (2), pp. 193-215  
 
McCulloch S. W. (1947) How We Know Universals: The Perception of Auditory and 
Visual Forms, Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 9, pp.127  
 
 
Metzner, Ralph (2008). The Expansion of Consciousness. Berkeley, CA: Green Earth 
Foundation & Regent Press 
 
Mlodinow L. (2011). Subliminal: How your  unconscious minds rules your behavior, 
First Vintage Books: New York 
 
Nader T. (2014) Stanford lectures: Higher States [Online],  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PE0ju4_y5R8 
 
Penrose R. (1990) Emperor’s new Mind.  Oxford:   Oxford University Press 
 
Schad J. N. (2016).  Brain Neurological Constructs: The neuronal Computational 
Schemes for Resolutions of Life Complexities, J. Neurol Neurophysiol., 7 (1) 
 
Schad J. (2016) Neurological Natures of   Thought and Vision, and Mechanisms of 
Perception Experiences, Neurol Stroke, 4 (5) 
 
Schwarz S. H. (1999), Visual Perception, McGraw Hill: New York 
 
Shinji Nishimoto; An T. Vu; Thomas Naselaris; Yuval Benjamini; Bin Yu; Jack L. 
Gallant (2011), Current Biology, 21 (19), pp. 1641-1646  
 
Turing Alan (1948), Machine Intelligence, in Copeland, B. Jack (eds.), The Essential 
Turing: The ideas that gave birth to the computer age, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
ISBN 0-19-825080-0 
 
Vartanian A. (1960) (tran.), La Mettrie's L'Homme Machine (1748): A Study in the 
Origins of an Idea, Princeton University Press,  
 
 16 
Von Neumann J. 1958. The Computer & The Brain, Yale University Press: London 
 
Woodham B.  (2014), Understanding and Designing Cognitive Systems. Lecture Notes 
2013/2014 Term 2, Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia : 
January–April, 2014 
. 
Acknowledgement 
 
Thanks are due to Dr. A. Hindi, for his enlightening insights and discussions, and to 
Professor S. Hedayat, for his review of the manuscript and many helpful suggestions.  
 
 
